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Abstract
The paper shows how to reform the platform of pension products so that pension savers, profes-
sional financial advisors, actuaries and investment experts intuitively understand the underlying
financial risk of the optimal investment profile. It is also pointed out that an excellent optimal
investment strategy can destroy the future expected utility of a pension saver if the financial
communication is wrong. It is shown that a simple system with an upper and a lower bound,
originally inspired by Merton [Harvard Business Review, 2014, 92 (7/8), 43–50], which can be
executed easily using fintech, can replace complicated power utility optimization for the pension
saver so that everyone can exactly understand the amount of financial risk taken. The paper
focuses on investing money as a lump sum because being able to communicate the associated
financial risk can serve as the first step towards communicating more complex pension saving
structures.
Keywords: investment analysis, finance, utility theory, risk management, OR in banking
1. Introduction
Communication and transparency have long been the insoluble challenge in the pension
market. The Transparency Task Force was, for example, set up by the British government in
connection with the recent Pension Schemes Act 2017. When the task force met in the House
of Commons in November 2016, Henry Tapper, actuary and founder of work place pension
broker Pension PlayPen, argued about the slow-pace development of transparency in products
as well as in communications. On the same note, in summer 2016, the financial journalist Joe
McGrath wrote an article in the online magazine Raconteur spelling out that “Pension fund
trustees are under increasing pressure from members, industry leaders and regulators to achieve
transparency, good returns and lower costs.” These are just two examples that clearly indicate
an ongoing daily effort to simplify and improve the pension system. The ultimate goal is that
pension savers know exactly what they buy and how much they have to pay for it.
According to Collins (2012), the majority of the population does not understand financial
risk well. It is important to ensure that the pension savers invest according to their risk
preferences. Furthermore, good communication is not sufficient. Pension products have to adapt
to simple communication until a one-one relationship between communication and financial
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construction is eventually reached. Simple, transparent and efficient pension platforms have to
be built and such fit well into current efforts for technological innovation in the financial sector.
Our starting point is the pension vision of the Nobel laureate Robert C. Merton (Merton, 2014),
who argues that a new pension system must be built so that more informed decisions are made
by all pension savers, including those lacking financial literacy. He suggests a pension system
containing a top and a bottom rate; the pension saver reveals his risk appetite indirectly by
choosing an individual combination of a top and a bottom rate according to his individual
circumstances. He also argues for a clever default for those pension savers who simply refuse to
take decisions. Merton did not publish technical details or communication details to his vision.
This paper does exactly that: we provide in an unprecedented way a communication platform
which is well-suited for an implementation by software and modern technology. We consider
here the lump-sum case. While interesting in itself, it serves as the building block for the
construction of a variety of pension annuity products which can have many different practical
features, as shown, for example, in Gerrard et al. (2018). After informally interviewing several
laymen and pension savers, we decided to simplify Merton’s approach by reducing the potential
choices to the pension saver down to picking the worst case (WC) investment result. The choice
is aided by a best case (BC) linked to every WC; the pension saver then receives BC half of
the time, and an investment result between WC and BC the rest of the time. Hence, a one-one
relationship between communication and financial construction is achieved. Section 2 presents
how this communication can look like, while Section 6 shows in a detailed simulation study
how that suffices to back-calculate an efficient investment strategy which incorporates the right
risk appetite for a specific customer. We highlight that the investment strategy is determined
without an abstract estimation of a risk-appetite parameter but via a simple one-one relationship
between communication and financial product.
Underlying to this communication is an original unhedged investment strategy based on an
exponential utility and a hedge based on the best and worst case boundaries leading to the final
strategy. While the pension savers do not need to know these technical details, we have also
simplified the technical communication of our investment universe. The reason for this is that,
if the financial and actuarial experts have a good grip of the technical details of their product
design, then such will lead to better products, communication, fewer internal errors, and lower
administration costs.
The main trick to obtaining this technical simplification is to use exponential utility, rather
than, for example, power utility optimization. In Section 6, we show that, while the selection
of the BC and WC is important for the financial utility of the pension saver, the underlying
investment strategy, i.e., the choice of a concrete utility function, plays a secondary role. It just
has to be risky enough to accommodate the variety of risk preferences wished for by the pension
savers when they limit their risk via the BC and WC boundaries. Going one step further, we
propose that picking the WC – with an automatically calculated BC that is reached 50% of
the time – is enough. It is good news that the simple decision that can be taken by pension
savers is also the most important one. This is the primary reason for this paper’s argument that
pension savers can self-select their investment strategy by answering a simple question, e.g., via
a fintech platform.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an introduc-
tory example of the proposed strategy with a one-one relationship between communication and
financial product. Sections 3–5 are concerned with the technical details of formulating a finan-
cial market model and with finding the optimal investment strategy thereof. In Section 6, we
demonstrate in a simulation study that the simple communication of Section 2 is indeed good
enough to back-calculate an optimal investment strategy tailored to the individual’s risk ap-
petite. Section 7 discusses possible extension routes of our lump-sum development and Section
8 concludes the paper. Detailed derivations are deferred to the appendix.
2. Lisa, John, Susan and James self-select their risk profiles
Consider the risk taker Lisa, the moderate risk taker John, the moderately risk averse Susan
and the risk averse James. Each of them wants to invest £10,000 with an investment horizon
of 30 years. Table 1 summarizes their optimal strategies in a power utility world. These
correspond to the different risk appetites our four protagonists have, described via the power
utility parameter ρ; refer also to our parameterization of the power utility in Section 4 for more
details. The optimal strategy is derived in a two-fund investment universe within the Black–
Scholes model setting (see Section 3) based on an investment of a constant relative amount
of the current wealth in the risky stock and the remainder in a risk-free inflation bond. The
investment outcomes in this section are therefore measured in real terms, as recommended in
Merton (2014) – see also Section 3.
Investor Lisa John Susan James
Risk appetite ρ
(power utility parameter) −0.25 −1 −4 −10
Percentage in stocks 75% 46% 19% 8%
Table 1: Power utility parameters of four investors and corresponding optimal strategies. The optimal strategies
are derived in a Black–Scholes world where the risky asset has a yearly mean excess return of 3.4% with a standard
deviation of 16%. (See Section 3 for a detailed description of the financial universe.)
The story would end here if the protagonist’s risk appetite were known a priori – but it is
not. We will now show how a simple question to Lisa, John, Susan and James will tell us what
kind of risk they want; we will show how they can self-select their risk and thereby their entire
investment strategy via a short decision process. The explosive growth of financial technology
in personal finance following the internet and mobile phone revolutions (e.g., see de Reyck and
Degraeve, 2003) should be exploited to further simplify the decision process. In particular, each
of the protagonists could be told via a smartphone application that:
• Your investment has a BC and a WC
• You will never drop below your WC
• Half of the time you will be receiving the BC and in the other half an investment result
between WC and BC
• Use a slider to see which WC suits you best. For every WC there is a link to a BC; BC
increases when WC decreases.
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Investor Lisa John Susan James
WC
(guarantee) £3,650 £6,500 £9,100 £9,650
BC
(achieved half of the time) £16,500 £15,200 £12,300 £11,000
Table 2: Optimal picks of worst case and best case (the goal) for the four investors, given their corresponding
power utility parameters ρ = −0.25,−1,−4,−10. The initial wealth is £10,000 and the investment horizon is 30
years. The optimal strategy is derived in the Black–Scholes world (see also notes in Table 1).
Table 2 shows the optimal choices of Lisa, John, Susan and James. All numbers are in
current values, i.e., adjusted for inflation. Lisa’s median in the unhedged world, where her
optimal strategy is to hold 75% in risky assets like stocks, would have been £13,496; with the
new hedging strategy, Lisa’s median is £16,500, i.e., this has increased by £3,004. She also
has a guarantee with her WC of £3,650, as opposed to no guarantee before. The price for
the increased median and the guarantee is that Lisa will not receive above her BC amount of
£16,500. In an unhedged world, Lisa would have had only 31% chance to exceed £16,500. So
we take away the gamble that she can achieve super returns less than one third of the time to
improve her WC scenario and the return she will achieve most of the time, hence we maximize
her median return.
We note that Lisa, John, Susan and James self-selected their risk profile and defined their
optimal investment strategy through a simple exercise using a slider on a mobile phone ap-
plication or web interface. The question they receive is directly linked to their investment
without any further, possibly abstract and detached, communication of risk preferences being
needed. Table 3 compares our proposed strategy with an optimal strategy in terms of certainty
equivalence. The optimal strategy is infeasible as the exact utility function and its parameter
are unknown. Nevertheless, the loss in terms of optimal utility by taking our simple one-step
financial advice is not material, which is our key point.
Investor Optimal strategy Hedged strategy
CE CE WC BC
Lisa £12,756 £12,017 £3,650 £16,500
John £11,643 £11,264 £6,500 £15,200
Susan £10,627 £10,416 £9,100 £12,300
James £10,280 £10,171 £9,650 £11,000
Table 3: Comparison of different strategies. Investors are assumed to obey a power utility with parameters
ρ = −0.25,−1,−4,−10, respectively. Initial wealth is £10,000 and investment horizon is 30 years. We assume a
Black–Scholes world (see also notes in Table 1). Certainty Equivalent (CE) is the certain amount for which the
investor would exchange the uncertain terminal lump sum.
We note that the loss is less than 2% for John, Susan and James, with Lisa’s being slightly
higher. If we go hunting for more sophisticated strategies, the potential gain will most likely
be well below 2%. Even a very sophisticated in-depth financial interview can never lead to
a perfectly optimal investment strategy, hence some uncertainty about the assessment of the
exact risk profile of Lisa, John, Susan and James will always exist.
Finally, we revisit the unhedged power utility world to assess the cost of misunderstandings.
Table 4 shows the value of the investment for Lisa, John, Susan and James if one of them
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through financial assessment is mistaken for another. The worst possible misspecification is if
the risk averse James is mistaken to be a risk taker like Lisa. Then James loses almost 80% of
the value of his investment. Lisa would lose almost 20% of the value of her investment had she
been mistaken to be a risk averse investor like James. In 5 out of the 16 cases the protagonists
not only lose money compared to the optimal strategy, but would also have been better off by
investing everything in the safe asset. The financial decision suggested above should be easy to
include in an innovative technological learning environment; see, e.g., Levina et al. (2009) for
considerations on necessary adjustments when the consumer is being addressed online.
Lisa’s plan John’s plan Susan’s plan James’ plan
Lisa’s CE £12,756 £12,326 £11,124 £10,536
John’s CE £11,023 £11,643 £11,023 £10,516
Susan’s CE £6,156 £9,268 £10,627 £10,437
James’ CE £2,388 £5,958 £9,879 £10,280
Table 4: Impact of miscommunication. Investors are assumed to obey a power utility with parameters ρ =
−0.25,−1,−4,−10, respectively (see additional notes in Table 3). Boldface cases indicate plans that are less
valued than the initial wealth of £10,000.
3. The model
The underlying financial model in this paper has a two-fund structure comprising a risk-free
fund and a risky fund. Under the two-fund theorem, this financial structure is more general
than it appears at first sight as every efficient portfolio can be reconstructed out of those two
funds.
Merton (2014) argues that all calculations and financial forecasts must be in current prices.
We model the risk-free fund earning an interest rate r. If we assume that the risk-free fund
is constructed so that it exactly compensates price inflation without any risk, i.e., r equals
inflation, then it replicates exactly what Merton looked for. But a risk-free inflation fund is not
feasible in practice. It is, however, intuitively clear that if the risk-free fund approximates an
inflation hedge with a low volatility, then the proposed financial model where r equals inflation
approximates a real and feasible investment strategy. In the following sections all strategies are
to be understood in current prices.
By way of further detail of the financial model, consider a single investor living in a Black–
Scholes environment. In the period [0, T ], T > 0, he can invest in a risky fund, S1, and a
risk-free fund, S0:
dS1(t) = µS1(t)dt+ σS1(t)dWt, dS0(t) = rS0(t)dt,
where W is a standard Brownian motion defined on the complete probability space (Ω,F ,P),
µ, σ, r > 0 are constants and S0(0) = S1(0) = 1. The information available to the investor is
represented by the filtration Ft = σ{W (s), s ∈ [0, t]}∨N (P), t ∈ [0, T ], where N (P) denotes the
collection of all P-null sets so that the filtration obeys the usual conditions. We will denote by
X(t) the current wealth at time t, of which π(t) is invested in the risky fund and the remainder
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in the risk-free fund, so that
dX(t) = r (X(t)− π(t)) dt+ (µdt+ σ dW (t))π(t)
= rX(t) dt+ (θ dt+ dW (t))σπ(t),
where θ = (µ− r)/σ is the market price of risk. In addition, we define the transformed process
Y (t) = er(T−t)X(t),
so that current wealth is measured in terminal time value. We have
dY (t) = σer(T−t)π(t) (θ dt+ dW (t)) . (1)
By definition Y (T ) = X(T ). This will become important in the next sections where we aim
to find the optimal strategy when maximizing the terminal expected utility E[U(X(T ))] =
E[U(Y (T ))], given a utility function U .
4. Unconstrained optimal investment strategies
4.1. Two utility function families
For a given positive wealth x, the power utility function is given by
Up(x) =
1
ρ
xρ; ρ ∈ (−∞, 1) \ 0. (2)
This is also known as isoelastic utility function being invariant to scaling, meaning that counting
the investors’ money in pence, pounds, or any other currency does not alter the optimal strategy.
A customer obeying this utility function is risk averse as the second derivative in x is negative.
One can also calculate the absolute and relative risk aversion coefficients given, respectively, by
Ap(x) = −
U ′′p (x)
U ′p(x)
=
1− ρ
x
, Rp(x) = −x
U ′′p (x)
U ′p(x)
= 1− ρ,
which are standard risk measures for utility functions. Hence, the power utility has a constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA).
The exponential utility function is given by
Ue(x) = −
1
γ
e−γx, (3)
where γ > 0, meaning that the customers are assumed to be risk averse as the second derivative
in x is negative. The absolute and relative risk aversion coefficients are given by
Ae(x) = −
U ′′e (x)
U ′e(x)
= γ, Re(x) = −x
U ′′e (x)
U ′e(x)
= γx,
hence the exponential utility function results in constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and
increasing relative risk aversion.
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In various examples from the academic literature some complicated optimization algorithms
are used to find the best future investment strategy for pension savers (e.g., Yu et al., 2012),
where statistical simulation is part of the numerical weaponry. Another challenge for the pension
saver is when the underlying theoretical model is at such a high academic level that ordinary
people are unable to understand it (e.g., Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero, 2008, Chai et al.,
2011, Sun et al., 2017). As a result, such approaches remain black boxes for the pension savers or
even the professional financial advisors. When the underlying argumentation and the substance
of the optimization is opaque to the those giving financial advice and those receiving it, there
is a risk that unfortunate financial decisions are made even if the underlying financial expert
systems are sophisticated. For example, Agnew et al. (2018), Buell et al. (2017), Lymer and
Richards (1995), and Pasiouras (2018) propose different arguments of the financial importance
of transparent processes between consumer and provider.
We propose to only maximize the expected utility of the terminal lump sum, X(T ). As we
will see in the next section, the power utility function optimization leads to a CRRA investment
strategy where a constant relative fraction A is invested in the risky asset; if, for example, A = 1,
then the whole investment is made in the risky asset at any time. Instead, the exponential utility
function optimization leads to a CARA strategy where a constant nominal amount C is invested
in the risky asset. The latter implies that any loss from investing in the risky asset is reinvested
by transferring exactly the lost amount from the safe fund to the risky fund; instead, any gain
from the risky asset is transferred to the risk-free fund. Intuitively, the CARA strategy is
attractive because, according to the law of large numbers, it seems clear that the investment
outcome will have a lower standard deviation than CRRA.
4.2. Optimal unconstrained investment strategy: CRRA versus CARA financial optimization
and transparency
In consistency with standard optimal control theory, we define the optimal value function
at time t
V (t, y) = sup
π
E[U(Y (T ))|Y (t) = y, strategy π is used].
The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation describing the dynamics of V is given by
sup
π
{
Vt + θσe
r(T−t)π(t)Vy +
1
2
σ2π(t)2e2r(T−t)Vyy
}
= 0,
where Vt, Vy and Vyy are the partial derivatives with respect to t and y (first and second order).
By utilizing the first-order condition in the optimization problem above, we find that the optimal
value of π is
π∗(t, y) = − θ
σ
e−r(T−t)
Vy
Vyy
,
and conclude that V satisfies
Vt −
θ2
2
V 2y
Vyy
= 0.
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Subject to the boundary conditions
V (T, y) =
{
1
ρy
ρ (power utility – see Equation 2)
− 1γ e
−γy (exponential utility – Equation 3)
,
it is straightforward to show that
V (t, y) =
 1ρyρe
θ2
2(1−ρ) (T−t) (power utility)
− 1γ e
− θ
2
2
(T−t)−γy (exponential utility)
yielding the optimal strategies
π∗(t, y) =
{
Ae−r(T−t)y (power utility)
Ce−r(T−t) (exponential utility)
, (4)
where
A =
θ
σ − ρσ
(5)
and
C =
θ
σγ
. (6)
Not surprisingly, in the exponential utility function, the optimal amount invested in the risky
asset is independent of the size of the fund. Subject to optimal control, the evolution of the size
of the fund is given by
Y ∗(t) =
{
y0e
(θσA− 12σ
2A2)t+σAW (t) (power utility),
y0 +R (θt+W (t)) (exponential utility)
,
where
R = Cσ =
θ
γ
. (7)
Both optimal strategies are comprehensible. From (4), we see that in the power utility case
there is a constant relative amount of wealth A invested in the risky asset at different points
in time; exponential utility suggests that there is a constant nominal amount C invested in the
risky asset. Nevertheless, the choices of A and C are difficult for most pension savers.
In Section 5, we will see that the problem of choosing A and C can be avoided by applying
a lower and an upper bound; a choice that most pension savers – financially literate or not – are
able to make. We will show that combining CARA with financial hedging leads to an attractive
and transparent investment strategy that enables simple self-selection of risk.
4.3. Local approximation of power utility functions
When a pension saver has to pick between the two presented utility functions, it can be
argued that a world with investors maximizing a power utility is more realistic than the expo-
nential utility analogue. Financial economics research is concerned with the choice of utility
function for use in different economic scenarios (see, among others, Kallberg and Ziemba, 1983,
Levy, 1992, Abbas, 2012 and Pliskin et al., 1980). Here, we will be choosing between power and
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Figure 1: Comparison of the exponential utility (with parameter γ = 9.77 × 10−5 yielding C = 9,480) against
the power utility with varying parameter ρ = −0.25,−1,−4,−10.
exponential utility. In subsequent sections, we will argue that, in our application, exponential
utility is to be preferred due to its technical simplicity and intuitive investment strategy, in ad-
dition to the minimal effect of the utility choice when an upper and a lower bound restrict the
range of possible outcomes. This is important when it comes to easily understandable strategies
allowing for communicating the risk and being in control of the investment.
In Section 2, we introduced Lisa, John, Susan and James and assumed that they are power
utility maximizers with parameters ρ = −0.25,−1,−4,−10, willing to invest £10,000. Figure 1
indicates that the exponential utility can approximate any power utility function locally. The
more risk averse the investors, the more the area around one point must be restricted, here
£10,000. Given that risk averse investors dislike significant fluctuation of their wealth from the
origin, this approximation might be just good enough. This leads to the next section where
we constrain the optimal strategy with an upper and lower bound for the terminal wealth.
The idea is that a constrained exponential strategy can be used to approximate a power utility
maximizer.
We note that the above is based on the assumption that our client has financial preferences
according to an unrestricted power or exponential utility function. One might also argue that
many people saving for retirement feel strongly about having a minimum outcome of their
savings, knowing they can at least survive to retirement and, perhaps, keep their house and still
be able to give Christmas presents to their grandchildren. Therefore, our constrained strategy
can be a more natural choice. We will discuss this further in Section 6.
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5. Constrained optimum with upper and lower bounds
In what follows, we consider a financial hedge using an upper and a lower bound under
relative risk aversion and, for the first time through this communication, constant absolute
risk aversion. To this end, the optimization of Section 4 is modified to a strategy that maxi-
mizes the terminal utility subject to the constraint P (GL ≤ X(T ) ≤ GU ) = 1 or, equivalently,
P (GL ≤ Y (T ) ≤ GU ) = 1, meaning:
max E[U(X(T ))],
subject to dX(t) = rX(t) dt+ (θ dt+ dW (t))σπ(t), X(0) > 0,
GL ≤ X(T ) ≤ GU , almost sure.
Under the assumptions that the investor obeys a power utility function and that a floor and a
top apply1, we argue later in Section 6 that the exponential utility strategy is in practice just
as useful as the power utility strategy.
We define P (t) as Y ∗(t), but with a different starting value:
P (t) =
{
Y ∗(t)P (0)/Y (0) (power utility)
Y ∗(t)− Y (0) + P (0) (exponential utility)
.
We further define
Y ∗∗(T ) =

GL, if P (T ) < GL
P (T ), if GL ≤ P (T ) ≤ GU
GU , if P (T ) > GU
. (8)
Our task is to show whether it is possible to find an admissible strategy which produces (8) as
the final result. Indeed, the next propositions state that the portfolio is optimal and feasible in
both the exponential and power utility worlds.
Proposition 1 (Constrained strategy under power utility). Define
c(t, y,GU ) = yΦ(d1(t, y,GU ))−GUe−r(T−t)Φ(d2(t, y,GU )),
p(t, y,GL) = GLe
−r(T−t)Φ(−d2(t, y,GL))− yΦ(−d1(t, y,GL)),
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function,
d1,2(t, y,G) =
1
σA
√
T − t
[
ln
( y
G
)
± 1
2
σ2A2(T − t)
]
and A is given by (5).
Under the assumption that GL < Y (0) < GU , there exists P (0) satisfying the budget con-
1It might be worth mentioning that, in earlier applications, authors have generally considered only downward
constraints. For example, Kraft and Steffensen (2013) formalize a problem where lump sum at discrete time
points is restricted by a value-at-risk or an expected shortfall constraint; Deelstra et al. (2003, 2004) consider
a possibly stochastic minimum guarantee and maximize the expected utility function of the terminal wealth;
Emmer et al. (2001) set up an optimization problem where they place a constraint on the capital at risk.
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straint
Y (0) = P (0)− c(0, P (0), GU ) + p(0, P (0), GL).
The solution P (0) and the process
Y ∗∗(t) = P (t)− c(t, P (t), GU ) + p(t, P (t), GL)
satisfy (8) and
GL ≤ Y ∗∗(t) ≤ GU , for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
The corresponding strategy
π∗∗(t) = A[1− Φ(d1(t, P (t), GU ))− Φ(−d1(t, P (t), GL))]P (t) (9)
is optimal for the constrained problem.
Proof. See Donnelly et al. (2018).
Proposition 2 (Constrained strategy under exponential utility). Define
c(t, y,GU ) = R
√
T − tH(d(t, y,GU )) + P (t)−GU ,
p(t, y,GL) = R
√
T − tH(d(t, y,GL)),
where R is given by (7),
H(x) = xΦ(x) + φ(x), (10)
d(t, y,G) =
G− y
R
√
T − t
,
and φ is the standard normal density function.
Under the assumption that GL < Y (0) < GU , there exists P (0) satisfying the budget con-
straint
Y (0) = P (0)− c(0, P (0), GU ) + p(0, P (0), GL).
The solution P (0) and the process defined by
dY ∗∗(t) = R(Φ(dU )− Φ(dL))(θdt+ dW (t)),
with
dL = d(t, P (t), GL), dU = d(t, P (t), GU ),
satisfy (8). The corresponding strategy
π∗∗(t) = Ce−r(T−t)(Φ(dU )− Φ(dL)), (11)
where C is given by (6), is optimal for the constrained problem.
Proof. See Appendix A.
11
Contrary to (9), formula (11) suggests a simple financial hedging strategy of taking the
initial wealth, e.g., of £10,000, of the original investment strategy and multiplying it by the
probability, under the risk-neutral measure, of staying within the lower and upper bounds. This
is easy to understand and will minimize the operational risk of misunderstanding and, perhaps,
manually change the hedging formula in the machine room of the actuarial office of any pension
provider. Most actuaries want to have an intuitive and hands-on understanding of any formula
they use. They are also personally responsible if things do not work out well. It is therefore
important that we have mathematical transparency as well as transparency in communication.
If the product developers of the pension provider are in full control and have no doubt about the
methodology they use, then this improves the chain of communication all the way through the
end customer. From Propositions 1 and 2, it becomes obvious that the hedging strategy based
on the exponential utility is intuitively comprehensible, contrary to the power utility, in the
product development office of the pension provider. Finally, it is worth noting that the strategy
holds at any future point in time; the calculation of the hedging is based on the probability of
staying within the boundaries given the financial situation today.
The simplicity of the mathematical hedging of this paper makes our strategy less black-
box-like and more intuitive internally in the company than, for example, strategies based on
stochastic programming, which, nevertheless, can be extremely powerful and useful for pensions;
see Geyer and Ziemba (2008) for a good example of dynamic stochastic programming of defined
contribution schemes as considered in this paper, and also Mulvey et al. (2008) for an example
in defined benefit schemes. We refer to Kraft and Munk (2011) for an intelligent life-cycle
modelling of household needs that optimize consumer needs, which, nevertheless, seems to fail
the simple communication requirement. It is not the purpose of the current research to provide
intelligent portfolio optimization based, for example, on market timing, e.g., Luo (2017); we
do believe, though, that the communicability promoted here can incorporate market timing
and dynamics in the future by introducing dynamic parameters. That is beyond the scope
of this work; a challenge for us remains the generalization of the current approach without
compromising its transmissibility. Financial planning is of course a hot issue at the moment,
but it has been for long; see Lymer and Richards (1995) and Smith and Keeney (2005) for
an alternative view on financial considerations of future safety. We do have a strong belief
that simplified communication is a powerful stepping-stone to optimizing financial advice. It is
easier for people to match their financial planning to personal circumstances when they fully
understand the financial products (see also Finke et al., 2017).
6. The value of further details in financial communication
The ease of financial communication of Section 2 implies minimization of the chance of
misclassifying consumers’ financial risk appetite.
In this section, we explain how direct identification of the risk aversion parameter is circum-
vented in our proposed communication. In the setting of Proposition 2, the optimal strategy
depends on the utility function parameter, the lower and the upper bound. We start with a
complex communication where the customer needs to pick these three parameters. Then, we
gradually reduce to a simple communication where only the lower bound is chosen, whilst the
12
utility parameter is given as a function of the initial wealth (C = Y (0), where C = θ/(σγ)
from Equation 6) and the upper bound is consequently chosen so that it can be achieved with a
50% probability. This simple one-dimensional problem leads to the communication proposed in
Section 2. We will argue that the financial gains when considering, instead, the more complex
three-dimensional problem are minimal. In addition, it adds uncertainty in the communication
and finding of the right parameters. Hence, in all, more complexity can easily lead to a less
favourable outcome.
6.1. Three-dimensional optimization
Suppose that the financial advisor is given more freedom in selecting a detailed financial
plan for the consumer based on the approach in this paper. In the first case, we let our
financial advisor pick freely the lower and upper bounds as well as the underlying investment
principles determined by the constant amount C invested in the risky asset. Hence, the pension
saver needs to pick three parameters from a three-dimensional space of parameters. Obviously
the financial communication is more complicated here as now the probabilities of reaching
the upper and lower bounds must also be communicated, in addition to ensuring that the
client understands the implication of selecting the underlying investment strategy and how
this interacts with the hedging based on the double bounds. Extra detail in the financial
communication will undoubtedly increase the likelihood of misclassification, and we know from
Section 2 that this can cause significant financial losses for the client (see Table 4). In Table
5, we assume that Lisa, John, Susan and James are CRRA optimizers with utility function
parameters ρ = −0.25,−1,−4,−10, respectively. We denote by CEopt the optimal certainty
equivalents under the infeasible, as ρ is practically unknown, optimal individual CRRA strategy,
and by CEρ=−0.25 the certainty equivalents under the optimal CRRA strategy with ρ = −0.25,
i.e., Lisa’s optimal strategy. Finally, we compare those values with a constrained CARA optimal
strategy. The three parameters, GL, GU , C, are chosen so that the certainty equivalent of the
agent is maximized. We find that a constrained CARA strategy can approximate closely the
optimal infeasible strategy. In particular, Lisa suffers the biggest loss and this does not exceed
2%.
Investor Unconstrained CRRA optimization 3-D Constrained CARA optimization
ρ CEopt CEρ=−0.25 CE GL GU C Prob. % loss
Lisa –0.25 £12,756 £12,756 £12,556 £4,050 £60,000 £9,100 0 1.56
John –1.00 £11,643 £11,023 £11,576 £5,150 £36,300 £5,100 0 0.57
Susan –4.00 £10,627 £6,156 £10,621 £7,000 £19,800 £1,900 0 0.05
James –10.00 £10,280 £2,388 £10,278 £8,350 £14,600 £900 0 0.02
Table 5: Comparison of different strategies with constrained strategy derived via three-dimensional (3-D) max-
imization optimizing GL, GU and C. The four investors are assumed to obey a power utility with parameters
ρ = −0.25,−1,−4,−10, respectively. Initial wealth is y0 = £10, 000 and the investment horizon is of T = 30 years
(see additional notes in Table 3). Certainty Equivalent (CE) is the certain amount for which the investor would
exchange the uncertain terminal lump sum, CEopt the certainty equivalent of the infeasible optimal strategy,
and CEρ=−0.25 the certainty equivalent under the optimal strategy for a power utility with parameter ρ = −0.25
(i.e., the optimal strategy for Lisa). Prob. is the probability that the terminal wealth equals the best case, GU .
% loss is the relative loss compared to the optimal strategy.
It is hard to imagine a financial advisor that would come that close to understanding Lisa’s
preferences from talking to her and that could estimate her power utility parameter, ρ, with
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an accuracy leading to a lower financial loss under a CRRA optimal strategy. CEopt shows the
sensitivity of the optimal strategies with respect to the right risk parameter ρ. However, also in
the constrained CARA optimization, the parameters GL, GU , C are a priori unknown. In Table
5, it is assumed that those parameters are picked in an optimal way translating to the case
of agents that perfectly understand the parameters and choose them accordingly. Obviously,
this might be far-fetched as, for a true understanding, the probabilities of reaching the upper
and lower bounds must be communicated as well as the nontrivial interaction with the hedging
based on the double bounds. This leads us to the second case.
6.2. Two-dimensional optimization
If less communication is preferred, while still giving the financial client the opportunity to
freely choose the upper and lower bounds, then one could fix the underlying unconstrained
investment strategy C equal to Y (0), here £10,000, but leaving the upper bound and lower
bound to be decided by the client. This way the pension saver needs to pick two parameters
from a two-dimensional space of parameters. This is less complicated than the previous detailed
communication, but still more than the strategy of Section 2. The financial losses compared to
the infeasible power utility strategy are given in Table 6, with the highest financial loss being
just 2.7%.
Investor Unconstrained CRRA optimization 2-D Constrained CARA optimization
ρ CEopt CEρ=−0.25 CE GL GU C Prob. % loss
Lisa –0.25 £12,756 £12,756 £12,550 £4,300 £60,000 £10,000 0.00 1.61
John –1.00 £11643 £11,023 £11,324 £6,900 £20,200 £10,000 0.21 2.74
Susan –4.00 £10,627 £6,156 £10,430 £8,850 £11,800 £10,000 0.63 1.85
James –10.00 £10,280 £2,388 £10,184 £9,500 £10,700 £10,000 0.69 0.93
Table 6: Comparison of different strategies with constrained strategy derived via two-dimensional (2-D) maxi-
mization optimizing GL, GU . C is fixed at the initial wealth. The four investors are assumed to obey a power
utility with parameters ρ = −0.25,−1,−4,−10, respectively. Initial wealth is y0 = £10,000 and the investment
horizon is of T = 30 years (see additional notes in Table 5).
Again this loss is so small that it is hard to imagine a financial advisor that could estimate
the infeasible constrained power utility parameter better than that.
6.3. Easy communication: The one-dimensional case
In the final case, we simplify the communication further to the setting of Section 2: see
Table 7. The highest financial loss compared to the infeasible strategy is 5.8%, but even this is
so low that we cannot imagine a real-life financial advisor approaching Lisa’s unknown financial
preferences more than our proposed financial strategy.
6.4. Additional comments
We note that the previous discussion is based on the assumption that our client has financial
preferences according to an unrestricted power utility function. One could also argue that many
people saving for retirement feel strongly about having a minimum outcome of their savings
so that they can at least survive to retirement, i.e., for instance, be able to keep their house
and pay their rent. If that is the case, then a reversed comparison where an unconstrained
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Investor Unconstrained CRRA optimization 1-D Constrained CARA optimization
ρ CEopt CEρ=−0.25 CE GL GU C Prob. % loss
Lisa –0.25 £12,756 £12,756 £12,017 £3,650 £16,500 £10,000 0.5 5.79
John –1.00 £11,643 £11,023 £11,264 £6,500 £15,200 £10,000 0.5 3.26
Susan –4.00 £10,627 £6,156 £10,416 £9,100 £12,300 £10,000 0.5 1.99
James –10.00 £10,280 £2,388 £10,171 £9,650 £11,000 £10,000 0.5 1.06
Table 7: Comparison of different strategies with constrained strategy derived via one-dimensional (1-D) maxi-
mization optimizing GL. The upper bound GU is uniquely defined as the value which can be reached with a
probability of 50% and C is fixed at the initial wealth. The four investors are assumed to obey a power utility
with parameters ρ = −0.25,−1,−4,−10, respectively. Initial wealth is y0 = £10,000 and the investment horizon
is of T = 30 years (see additional notes in Table 5).
CRRA strategy is wrongly followed – independent of the chosen risk aversion parameter –
would lead to a utility of minus infinity. This means that, not only is the power utility function
hard to communicate and estimate in praxis, but it might also at the same time not represent
many pension savers’ risk preferences. We further argue that the majority of pension savers
entrusting their money to a pension provider would oppose gambling. If we define gambling as
having a financially beneficial outcome in a minority of cases at the cost of a significantly worse
outcome in most cases, then that would lead us to exactly the risk preferences suggested in our
communication. If the risk preferences suggested by our financial strategy are exactly matching
the client’s, then our approach is both financially optimal in a mathematical sense and easy to
communicate. We believe this to be the case.
7. Extension to annuities
Useful as our development of the lump sum case is, it unblocks the road to universality. In
particular, we mention here annuities involving a random number of random future monthly
payments. When adapting to annuities, the product of Section 2 offered to the customer is
altered as follows: the worst case scenario is that the annuity will be reduced after a certain
number of years of guaranteed high payments; the best case scenario is that the annuity will
continue at the same high level life-long.
In a recent research event titled “Self-selection and Risk Sharing in a Modern World of
Life-Long Annuities” hosted by the Actuarial Research Centre of the Institute and Faculty of
Actuaries, practitioners and academics were invited to discuss a presentation based on these
ideas; we refer to Gerrard et al. (2018) for a detailed treatment of this extension. More specifi-
cally, building upon the current approach in this paper, the authors, first, introduce a mortality
pooling approach defined in Bräutigam et al. (2017) to ensure that a pool of individuals can
hedge mortality risk without involving intermediaries. Second, they explain how investment
risk pooling and hedging of an inflation fund can ensure that payments are communicated and
guaranteed in real terms. Finally, the worst and best cases are reformulated as aforesaid.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we suggest a combination of constant absolute risk aversion with an upper
and a lower bound to meet Merton’s vision of creating a transparent platform for pension
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products. We focus on real returns and introduce an inflation fund without risk as well as a
risky fund based on stocks. A single investment strategy with a lump-sum payment is then
considered; this is part of most pension schemes, so it is important itself. This way we learn
how to communicate risk and allow the pension saver self-select his simple pension decision
case, before considering more complicated actuarial constructions like life annuity products.
We conclude that self-selection is possible via our intuitive and easy-to-understand combination
of constant absolute risk aversion and double bounds. Future research is targeted towards
generalizing the results in a situation with risk in the inflation fund as well as more complicated
actuarial pension constructions, including mortality-dependent annuity products, and financial
investment constructions including market timing.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
We define the martingale measure Q such that WQ(t) = W (t) + θt is a standard Brownian
motion. With this in mind, we write
P (t) = P (0) +RWQ(t).
Conditional on the history of the process until time t > 0,
P (T ) = P (0) +R(WQ(t) +
√
T − t Z),
where Z is a standard normal random variable under Q. We note that
P (T ) > GU ⇐⇒ WQ(t) +
√
T − t Z > R−1 (GU − P (0)) ⇐⇒ Z > dU ,
where
dU =
1√
T − t
[
R−1 (GU − P (0))−WQ(t)
]
and, similarly, we have that P (T ) < GL is the same as the event Z < dL, where
dL =
1√
T − t
[
R−1 (GL − P (0))−WQ(t)
]
.
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Y (t) is given by the present value of the portfolio at time t under Q:
Y (t) = EQ
(
max (GL,min (GU , P (T )))| FQt
)
= EQ
(
P (T )| FQt
)
+ EQ
(
max(GL − P (T ), 0)| FQt
)
− EQ
(
max(P (T )−GU , 0)| FQt
)
=
∫ dL
−∞
GLφ(z) dz +
∫ ∞
dU
GUφ(z) dz +
∫ dU
dL
(
P (0) +R(WQ(t) +
√
T − tz)
)
φ(z) dz
= GLΦ(dL) +GU [1− Φ(dU )] +
(
P (0) +RWQ(t)
)
[Φ(dU )− Φ(dL)]
−R
√
T − t [φ(dU )− φ(dL)]
= GU −R
√
T − t [H(dU )−H(dL)] ,
where H is given by (10). As H ′(x) = Φ(x) ∈ (0, 1) and dL < dU , we deduce that
0 ≤ H(dU )−H(dL) ≤ dU − dL =
1√
T − t
R−1(GU −GL),
confirming that P (GL ≤ Y (t) ≤ GU ) = 1 for all t.
Returning to the standard measure P, we can write both dL and dU as functions of t and
w = W (t):
dL(t, w) =
1√
T − t
[
R−1 (GL − P (0))− w − θt
]
,
dU (t, w) =
1√
T − t
[
R−1 (GU − P (0))− w − θt
]
,
with
∂dL
∂t
= − θ√
T − t
+
dL
2(T − t)
,
∂dL
∂w
= − 1√
T − t
,
and similarly for dU . By exploiting the expressions for dL and dU , we rewrite Y (t) = η(t,W (t)),
where η satisfies
∂η
∂t
=
R
2
√
T − t
[H(dU )−H(dL)]−R
√
T − t
[
H ′(dU )
∂dU
∂t
−H ′(dL)
∂dL
∂t
]
=
R
2
√
T − t
[H(dU )−H(dL)]
+Rθ [Φ(dU )− Φ(dL)]−
R
2
√
T − t
[dUΦ(dU )− dLΦ(dL)]
=
R
2
√
T − t
[φ(dU )− φ(dL)] +Rθ [Φ(dU )− Φ(dL)] ,
∂η
∂w
= −R
√
T − t
(
H ′(dU )
∂dU
∂w
−H ′(dL)
∂dL
∂w
)
= R [Φ(dU )− Φ(dL)] ,
∂2η
∂w2
= − R√
T − t
[φ(dU )− φ(dL)] ,
so that
dY (t) =
(
∂η
∂t
+
1
2
∂2η
∂w2
)
dt+
∂η
∂w
dW (t) = R (Φ(dU )− Φ(dL)) (θ dt+ dW (t)) .
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From (1),
dY (t) = σer(T−t)π(t) (θ dt+ dW (t)) ,
suggesting that the strategy is given by
π∗∗(t, y) = Ce−r(T−t) (Φ(dU )− Φ(dL)) ,
giving rise to the terminal expression (8) for Y ∗∗(T ).
Let V0(t, y) be the value function of the proposed solution:
V0(t, y) = E
(
−1
γ
e−γY (T )|Y (t) = y
)
.
We demonstrate the optimality of π∗∗ by showing that V0 satisfies the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman
equation and that π∗∗ is the strategy giving rise to Y (t). We are faced with the problem that
Y (t) is only defined as a function of W (t) and t. We therefore write
V0 (t, Y (t)) = V0 (t, η (t,W (t))) = V̄ (t,W (t)) ,
so that
∂V̄
∂t
=
∂V0
∂t
+
∂V0
∂y
∂η
∂t
, (A.1)
∂V̄
∂w
=
∂V0
∂y
∂η
∂w
,
∂2V̄
∂w2
=
∂2V0
∂y2
(
∂η
∂w
)2
+
∂V0
∂y
∂2η
∂w2
. (A.2)
Now
P (T ) = P (0) +R (θT +W (T ))
D
= P (0) +R
(
θT +W (t) +
√
T − tZ
)
,
where Z is a standard normal random variable under the original probability measure P. As a
result,
P (T ) > GU ⇐⇒ Z > DU (t, w)
def
= dU (t, w)− θ
√
T − t
(DL follows similarly from P (T ) < GL). Given the previous definition, we get
V̄ (t, w) = E
(
−1
γ
e−γY (T )|W (t) = w
)
= −1
γ
(∫ DL
−∞
e−γGLφ(z) dz +
∫ ∞
DU
e−γGUφ(z) dz +
∫ DU
DL
e−γ(P (0)+R(θT+w+
√
T−tz))φ(z) dz
)
= −1
γ
(
e−γGLΦ(DL) + e
−γGU (1− Φ(DU ))
+e−γP (0)−
1
2
θ2(T+t)−θw
(
Φ(DU + θ
√
T − t)− Φ(DL + θ
√
T − t)
))
,
with
∂V̄
∂w
= −1
γ
(
e−γGU
φ(DU )√
T − t
− e−γGL φ(DL)√
T − t
− θe−γP (0)−
1
2
θ2(T+t)−θw (Φ(dU )− Φ(dL))
− e−γP (0)−
1
2
θ2(T+t)−θw
(
φ(dU )√
T − t
− φ(dL)√
T − t
))
.
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As
φ(DU ) =
e−
1
2
d2U+θdU
√
T−t− 1
2
θ2(T−t)
√
2π
= φ(dU )e
− 1
2
θ2(T−t)+γGU−γP (0)−θw−θ2t
= φ(dU )e
γGU−γP (0)− 12 θ
2(T+t)−θw
(similarly for DL), we get that
∂V̄
∂w
= Re−γP (0)−
1
2
θ2(T+t)−θw (Φ(dU )− Φ(dL))
and, consequently,
∂2V̄
∂w2
= Re−γP (0)−
1
2
θ2(T+t)−θw
(
−θ (Φ(dU )− Φ(dL))−
1√
T − t
(φ(dU )− φ(dL))
)
.
Then, from (A.2),
∂V0
∂y
= e−γP (0)−
1
2
θ2(T+t)−θw,
∂2V0
∂y2
=
∂2V̄
∂w2
− ∂V0∂y
∂2η
∂w2(
∂η
∂w
)2 = −γ e−γP (0)− 12 θ2(T+t)−θwΦ(dU )− Φ(dL) ,
and from (A.1),
∂V0
∂t
= e−γP (0)−
1
2
θ2(T+t)−θw
(
Rθ
2
(Φ(dU )− Φ(dL)) +
R
2
√
T − t
(φ(dU )− φ(dL))
)
−e−γP (0)−
1
2
θ2(T+t)−θw
(
Rθ (Φ(dU )− Φ(dL)) +
R
2
√
T − t
(φ(dU )− φ(dL))
)
= −Rθ
2
e−γP (0)−
1
2
θ2(T+t)−θw (Φ(dU )− Φ(dL)) ,
from which
∂V0
∂t
− θ
2
2
(
∂V0
∂y
)2
∂2V0
∂y2
= 0
follows.
Finally, we prove that it is possible to choose P (0) in such a way that the budget constraint
X(0) = x0 is satisfied. The budget constraint is
erTx0 = Y (0) = η(0, 0)
= GU −R
√
T
[
H
(
R−1
GU − P (0)√
T
)
−H
(
R−1
GL − P (0)√
T
)]
with its derivative with respect to P (0) given by
Φ
(
R−1
GU − P (0)√
T
)
− Φ
(
R−1
GL − P (0)√
T
)
> 0.
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The smallest and largest possible values are therefore the limits as P (0)→ ±∞: at the top end,
GU −R
√
T lim
q→∞
∫ R−1(GU−q)/√T
R−1(GL−q)/
√
T
Φ(z) dz = GU ,
and at the bottom end,
GU −R
√
T lim
q→−∞
∫ R−1(GU−q)/√T
R−1(GL−q)/
√
T
Φ(z) dz
= GU −R
√
T
(
R−1(GU − q)√
T
− R
−1(GL − q)√
T
)
= GL,
as expected. We conclude that it is always possible to find a value of P (0) such that the budget
constraint is satisfied as long as
GL < e
rTx0 < GU .
Assuming that this inequality holds, we have a strategy which is feasible and has a value function
satisfying the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation: we conclude that this must be the optimal
strategy.
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